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There are two schools of thoughts on the important issue of reforming state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  We call them the ownership school and the management school.  The 
ownership school argues that the key to the reform is to diversify SOEs’ ownership, 
including privatization, in order to eliminate government control of SOEs. The 
management school emphasizes the need to improve government’s management of SOEs 
by, for example, granting SOE employees autonomy and profit incentives.  Utilizing a 
data set of 680 SOEs in China, covering the period of 1980 to 1994, we test the relative 
effectiveness of these two kinds of reform measures.  This is possible due to the fact that 
reform measures based on each of these two schools of thoughts were practised in China.  
Our results yield strong support for the ownership school while leaving very mixed 
evidence for the management school.  Moreover, we find that the impact of ownership 
diversification was of the same order of magnitude on the economic performance of state 
enterprises as that of enhancing product market competition. 
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State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which refer to the enterprises with majority 
government ownership and under direct government control, continue to be difficult 
targets of reform in many economies under reform.   In China, despite of many years of 
reform, SOEs are still drags on the economy by occupying 70% of bank credits, 
employing 50% of non-agricultural labor force, but producing less than 25% of total 
industrial output.
1 
Along with the long and difficult history of SOE reform, there have been 
continuous debates on strategies of SOE reform in the academic community.   In the 
debates, two schools of thoughts stand out.
2   They have distinct explanations of the 
sources of the inefficiency of SOEs and the best approaches to reforming them.  One 
school can be called the ownership school.  According to this school, SOEs are 
intrinsically inefficient, since they are controlled by government agencies and 
government agencies are bad “owners”, causing a litany of bad SOE behavior.  One 
underlying theory of the ownership school is that government agencies have multiple 
objectives.  Social efficiency or social welfare might be one of them, while taxation and 
employment are often other objectives.  Having such complicated objectives, it is often 
argued, government agencies are incompetent owners of SOEs.  
Thus, the key of the SOE reform, according to the ownership school, is to separate 
the government from the SOE.  Privatization, broadly defined as a way for the 
                                                 
1 Although we are mostly concerned with SOE reform in transition economies, the same issue is also of 
great importance in OECD countries.  The discussions on SOEs in OECD countries can be found in 
Toninelli (2000). 
 
2 In addition to the two schools of thought, it is often argued that enhancing product market competition is 
an important measure to reform SOEs.  We focus on the ownership school and the management school, 
since we believe that they are concerned with internal and fundamental changes in SOEs.   Improved 
product market competition or, in general, better market environment is important for improving SOE 
performance but they are external to SOE organizations and cannot be fundamental means to resolve the 
SOE problem.  This is why we treat the extent of product market competition as a control variable in our 
empirical tests. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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government to retreat from controlling SOEs, is essential to achieve this goal.  Many 
economists have long articulated the views of this school.  For example, in his analysis of 
the former socialist systems, Kornai (Kornai, 1992) has maintained that the root problem 
of the inefficiencies of socialism and of state enterprises   is bureaucratic control.   
Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) blame politicians’ influence of enterprise decisions 
for the inefficiency of state enterprises.   
The other school believes that nothing is intrinsically inefficient with SOEs.   
SOEs are no difference from those listed companies in market economies, such as IBM, 
with widely spread public ownership.  The reason that SOEs are inefficient, according to 
this school, is because the government as the largest shareholder has not been effective in 
managing its investment.  Therefore, the solution to the SOE problem is to improve 
government’s management of SOEs.  Possible measures include granting SOE 
managerial autonomy and linking the bonus of SOE managers and employees to the SOE 
performance.  We call this the management school.  It should be noted that in this school 
of thinking, by management, it refers to the government-enterprise relations, rather than 
managerial efficiency within the enterprise.  The SOE is traded as a unit and how the 
government manages the SOE is the key issue.  
There are many lines of theories that may support the management school.   Two 
stand out most prominently:  theories of decentralization and the principal-agent theories.   
Theories of decentralization argue for the benefit of decentralization or delegation by 
granting a degree of autonomy to lower level agencies.  One of such benefits is better 
utilization of local information.  In the context of SOEs, the implication is that 
government agencies have had too tight control of SOE employees.  To improve 
efficiency, granting more autonomy to SOE employees including managers is useful.     
According to the principal-agency theories, government agencies are principals while William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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SOE employees are agents.  In order to motivate the agent to pay effort to improve the 
performance of the SOE, the principal needs to provide incentives.  One way is for 
government agencies to share SOE profit with SOE employees.  
The theoretical underpinning of the ownership school can be found in many 
political economy analyses of the government and the policy making process.  A common 
scenario of such analyses is that government officials care about their own personal 
benefits, pecuniary or non-pecuniary, and are subject to influences of various pressure 
groups in the economy.  Grossman and Helpman (1994 and 1995) provide a rigorous 
analysis of such a set-up.  Given that the lobbying process tends to favor those pressure 
groups who have better access to the government officials, one cannot expect that final 
amount of contributions to government officials are of the same proportion to the pressure 
groups’ economic interests.   Meanwhile, government officials make decisions based on 
the total size of contribution.  The equilibrium of the political influence game is that 
government officials make policy decisions as if they are after a distorted social welfare 
function.   Alternatively, government officials could be perceived as maximizing social 
welfare plus a non-social-welfare related objective.  
Despite the long-standing and sharp division between the two schools of thoughts 
on SOE reform in their theoretical underpinning and policy recommendation, there has 
been little empirical research aiming to directly test the validity of the two theories.     
Instead, most of existing empirical research has been embedded in one of the two schools.    
For example, Barberis, et al (1996) test the mechanism through which privatization of 
Russian shops improves efficiency.  Frydman, et al. (1999) are also concerned with the 
impact of privatization on firm’s performance.   On the other hand, Groves, et al. (1994 
and 1995) examine how granting autonomy and profit incentives to SOE managers 
improves SOE’s performance and how improving managerial incentives helps improving William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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SOE’s efficiency.  Li (1997) measures how managerial reform and increased market 
competition enhance enterprise efficiency.   While testing the importance of managerial 
reform, Groves, et al. (1994 and 1995) and Li (1997) do not consider that of ownership 
changes. 
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically test the two schools of thoughts of 
SOE reform.  We are able to do so by utilizing a unique data set on China’s SOE reform 
where both ownership reform (although marginal) and managerial reform have been 
implemented.  The data set tracks 680 Chinese state-owned enterprises in a period of 15 
years from 1980 to 1994.  Departing from the large amount of empirical research on 
China’s SOE reform, we observe and document the fact that during this 15-year period, 
both managerial reforms and ownership reform were implemented in China.   Ownership 
reform in China was not in the form of a large-scale and thorough privatization.   Instead, 
ownership changes in Chinese state enterprises came about by introducing non-
government sources of investment funds.  State enterprises were allowed to raise 
investment funds from their employees, foreign investors, non-state enterprises, and 
outside individual investors.  As a result, state enterprises in China have undergone steady 
changes in ownerships over time. The state ownership has been gradually diluted while 
the non-state owners penetrated into the enterprises. Meanwhile, managerial reforms were 
also implemented concurrently.  Through observations of enterprises undergoing both 
kinds of reforms, we are able to evaluate the relative importance of each kind of reforms. 
In the next section, we discuss the institutional changes in China’s enterprise 
reforms. Section 3 will discuss the dataset and the research methodology. The results are 
reported in Section 4, which is followed by concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The Evolution of China’s State Enterprise Reform William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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In comparison with other transition economies, China not only has had one of the 
longest histories of state enterprise reform but also has experimented a variety of 
measures of reform in the process.  The entire period of state enterprise reform can be 
roughly divided into three stages.  The first stage of the reform, which lasted the whole 
1980’s, espoused the thinking of managerial school of reform and implemented many 
interesting reform measures.  The most common form is the so-called contract 
responsibility system, in which SOE managers or the entire employees of an enterprise 
were asked to sign performance contracts with the supervising government agencies.   By 
the early 1990’s, such reforms ran into serious trouble and stalled gradually due to wide 
spread renegotiation of government-enterprise contracts.   
The second stage of China’s state enterprise reform was implemented in the first 
half of the 1990s, aiming at separating SOEs’ daily management from direct government 
control. The objective is that government agencies should not issue administrative 
commands to SOEs.  To implement that measure, many SOEs were incorporated as 
independent legal entities.  As a result, the government agencies that had been the 
supervisors of SOEs became SOEs’ equity holders.   
While the intellectual thinking behind this stage of reform is still the managerial 
school, corporatization opens up avenues to diversify the ownership structure of SOEs.  
Although privatization of entire enterprise was not allowed, it is possible for other types 
of investors to hold equity shares of the SOEs.  As a result, the equity structure of an 
enterprise changed gradually with government agencies owning less than 100% shares.  It 
only diversifies ownership structure in the incremental part of an SOE assets rather than 
selling existing stock of assets to non-government investors. Thus, incidentally, the 
second stage of the reform actually started the process of ownership diversification of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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China’s SOEs.   This is a point that is often neglected by observers of China’s SOE 
reform and other transition economies.  
The third stage of China’s state enterprise reform involves extensive ownership 
changes.  By the mid 1990s, many SOEs ran into serious financial difficulties and the 
urgency of the enterprise reform has become increasingly acute.  Building upon lessons 
from previous two stages of reform, the Chinese government began to formulate policies 
that amounted to privatization or liquidation of some of the state enterprises.    
China’s long history of state enterprise reform provides the best opportunity to 
tests the two competing schools of thought of state enterprise reform.   Not only that 
different enterprises have undergone different reforms it is also true that by often times in 
one state enterprise, different reform measures have been imposed at the same time. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. The Data  
The data set we use is unique in the sense that it covers all three stages of the 
reform.  It is based on two surveys of 680 state enterprises covering the period of 1980-
1994.  The first survey was conducted in 1990 by a research team consisting of 
economists from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Oxford University, 
and the University of Michigan.  The survey gathered enterprise information from 1980 to 
1989.  The second survey was implemented in 1995 by researchers from the CASS and 
the University of Michigan and collected information on the same group of enterprises 
from 1990 to 1994. The data covers four provinces, including Jilin, Jiangsu, Shanxi, and 
Sichuan, representing four geographical of regions of economic development in China.  
(Northeast, East, North, and West). The sample SOEs come from 39 industries, which we 
grouped into five major industrial categories: mining and utility, heavy manufacturing, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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chemical, light manufacturing, and others. Unlike surveys of the state enterprises 
conducted by government agencies, the two surveys were carefully designed and pilot 
tested by economics researchers.  The data set contains detailed information on the 
operations and financial information of the SOEs in the sample. It also contains 
qualitative information from the senior managements of the SOEs.  The first part of the 
dataset was widely used in studies such as Groves, et al. (1994 and 1995) and Li (1997). 
The criterion of selecting the sample was to represent the population distribution 
of SOEs in each of the surveyed provinces in 1990.  However, given that it was much 
easier for the surveyors to obtain valid response from large and medium SOEs --- such 
firms were under tighter government control and were more responsive to requests of 
cooperation from the local government, the actual sample of valid data is biased towards 
these two types of SOEs.   The same can be said about the second survey, since the 
overall structure of Chinese SOEs did not change radically between 1990 and 1994. 
 
3.2.  The Design of the Econometric Test  
We adopt the program evaluation approach to test the propositions based on the 
two schools of the enterprise reform.  That is, we include in our empirical model two sets 
of proxies that represent the measures for managerial reform and ownership reforms 
respectively to see how these proxies can explain variances in the performance of state 
enterprises.   Specifically, the econometric model we use is as follows: 
 
yit = fi + α m mit + α o oit + α z zit +  ε it      (1)  
where: 
yit  : a measure of the performance of the enterprise i at time t;  
fi  :  the firm specific fixed effect variable which is not observed;  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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mit : a vector of measures of the managerial reform applied to firm i at time t;   
oit : a measure of ownership changes at firm i at time t; 
zit :  a vector of control variables at firm i at time t; 
ε it    : the error term.  
Measuring Enterprise Performance yit 
For the performance measure yit , we use two alternative approaches.  The first is 
to measure the total factor productivity (TFP) of the enterprise.
3 The TFP is an accurate 
measure of a firm’s production efficiency, since it measures the relationship between a 
firm’s input and output after taking out any effects of price changes.  Indeed, it has been 
the most popular measure of SOE performance.   However, a drawback of the TFP as a 
performance measure is that it does not take into account changes in the behavior of the 
firm.  It is because the TFP is based on production function of a firm.  Under the 
assumption of profit maximising managers, other things being equal, a higher TFP means 
higher efficiency.  This assumption is acceptable for modern enterprises in mature market 
economies.  For state owned enterprises, which have non-profit objectives, it is possible 
that a higher TFP may induce a lower efficiency and more waste of resources.  Bai, Li, 
Wang (1998) have a simple model to illustrate this possibility.  Here for the purpose of 
comparison with previous work, we use the TFP as a measure of SOE performance. 
  The TFP can be obtained by regressing the real output on real inputs such as 
capital, labor, and raw materials.  After obtaining the TFP of a firm of each year, we use 
model (1) to evaluate the impact of each reform measures.  Equivalently, we can combine 
the two steps by doing the following regression: 
 
                                                 
3 The TFP is defined as the portion of a firm’s real output (i.e., the value of output divided by accumulated 
inflation from a base year) that is not explained by real inputs, including labor, capital, and raw materials. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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Log(Yit)  =  fi + α m mit + α o oit + α z zit   +  β l log(Lit)+ β 2 log(Kit)+ β 3log(Mit) + η it    (2) 
where: 
Yit : real output;  
Lit : size of labor force the enterprise;   
Kit : capital of the firm; 
Mit : raw material; 
η it   : the error term; 
the TFP refers to the whole term fi + α m mit + α o oit + α z zit   + η it . 
Given that the TFP may not be an appropriate measure of SOE performance, we 
also use an alternative measure of enterprise performance.  It is called the gross rate of 
return on assets (GROR).  The GROR is constructed as before-tax profit based on market 
prices divided by the total net asset value of the firm.   The before tax profit is calculated 
by adjusting all raw material and output prices to market prices and then dividing all by 
economy-wide inflation rate.   In addition, wage rates are adjusted by weeding out extra 
bonuses, which were returns to employees’ de facto control rights of the state enterprise 
and should be excluded from normal wage costs.   The net asset value is adjusted by 
perpetual inventory method and by deflating the nominal value of investment of each 
year. 
The GROR based on market prices captures the total return to one unit of 
investment available for division among the stakeholders.   The stakeholders of an SOE 
include employees, banks, government agencies, and other investors.   Thus, the GROR is 
a composite index of the economic efficiency of an enterprise incorporating many factors.  
An improvement in the behavior of SOE managers should be reflected in the GROR.  A 
higher TFP coupled with profit maximizing decisions of an SOE also increases the 
GROR.  Thus, it should be more accurate than the TFP.  It is also more accurate than William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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accounting profitability of the enterprise, since the latter is subject to changes in bonuses 
paid to SOE employees.   
As will be shown later, indeed, in the sample, TFP and GROR are very different 
measures of SOE performance since the statistically correlation between these two is very 
small. 
 
Measuring Managerial Autonomy and Incentive mit 
We follow Groves, et al. (1994) in measuring managerial autonomy and incentive 
mit .  For managerial autonomy, they used a dummy variable auto1it that is equal to 1 if 
for firm i by year t, according to the interview with the director of the SOE, the director 
had obtained production autonomy.  That it, if auto1it =1, then by year t, the director of 
SOE i was already able to decide on what to produce and how much to produce.   
Alternatively, we also use auto2it equalling to the percentage of the enterprise’s output 
sold to market in total output.   The rest of the output was turned to the government at 
planned price. 
As the measure of incentive, we use the sum of the two contractual rates of profit 
retention.   The first is the pre-agreed rate of profit retention for the SOE and other is the 
rate of profit retention if the total profit is beyond a pre-determined level.  We used the 
sum of these two since when the total profit is high, it is the expected rate of profit 
retention.  This is consistent with Groves, et al. (1994). 
 
Measuring Ownership Diversity oit 
The index of ownership diversity oit is meant to capture the percentage of non-
government shares in the enterprise’s total capital stock.  For this purpose, we construct 
two series of capital stock for each enterprise.  One is the total capital stock constructed William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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by the perpetual inventory method as in the case of Kit in the production function.  The 
other is the capital stock constructed similarly by only using each year’s investment from 
non-government sources.  The ratio of the second capital stock to that of the first one 
constitutes the ownership diversity index oit  which falls between 0 and 1. 
By non-government sources of investment, we include investments from 
collective enterprises, foreign enterprises, employees of the enterprises, etc.  The common 
feature among the diverse forms of the non-government investments is that the investors 
are much less likely to pursue non-economic objectives as the supervising government 
agencies of the SOEs. This way, having accumulated non-government sources of 
investments, in essence changes the ownership composition of the SOE.   This is why we 
use the index oit to capture the extent of ownership reform. 
According to the ownership school, when the SOE ownership is diversified, there 
are many behavioural consequences for the SOE, some of which improves efficiency, 
while others do not help.  Theoretical works of the ownership school do not seem to have 
consensus on the detailed behavioural changes but they all agree that the net impact 
should be positive.   Here we do not focus on the behavioural consequences and directly 
test the net and final impact of ownership diversification on the SOE performance, on 
which the ownership school has a clear prediction. 
Control Variables zit 
The main control variable we include in the regression is a measure of market 
competition since previous works have shown that this is an important factor inducing 
better performance of China’s state enterprises in the reform era.  Following Li (1997), 
we calculate the difference between the growth of input price and output price for each William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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year and each enterprise.
4   We use this as a reverse index of the mark-up ratio.   That is, 
when this index is high, the terms of trade of the firm worsens and the mark-up ratio is 
low.   The mark-up ratio, a standard measure of product market competition, is defined as 
the ratio between the product price and the marginal cost of the firm.  In general, a high 
mark-up ratio means that the firm enjoys a high market power, and faces low levels of 
competition. Note that our reverse index of mark-up ratio varies with both enterprise and 
year and takes into account both regional and industrial differences. 
It is interesting to note that in principle, the reverse index of mark-up ratio has two 
opposite impact on the enterprises’ gross rate of return on assets.   The direct impact is 
negative, since a higher reverse index means more competition which lowers the rate of 
return.  The indirect impact is positive, i.e., more competition leads higher efficiency of 
the SOE which in turns improves the financial performance of the SOEs.  The net effect 
depends on which effect is more prominent.  As will be shown later, indeed, the net effect 
is positive. 
For the TFP based regressions, we include the logrithum of labor, capital, material 
as well as these multiplied by industry dummies.  These variables are needed to form 
production function regressions and the industry dummies are important in order to take 
into account of different types of technology of SOEs in different industries.  
In the GROR regressions, we include for control variables, 1984 dummy, 1989 
dummy, 1993 dummy, and time trend (time variable).  The year dummies are meant to 
capture the nation-wide high inflation effects, which tend to bias the measure of GROR.   
The time trend is added in order to control for the possible effect that over the years, all 
                                                 
4 The data report the price changes of the firm’s the main output and main input.  This also the basis for us 
to deflation price changes in order to obtain real input and output.  Unlike a modern conglomerate, an SOE 
were mostly established as a plant making a main product.  Thus, such an approach to measuring mark-up 
ratio is not too distortionary. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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SOEs experience lower GROR due to less favourable policies of the government with the 
SOEs. 
 
4.  Results of the Empirical Tests  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Before discussing the regression results, let us first take a look at the summary 
statistics of the key variables used in our study.   Table 1 categorizes those variables in 
the test period.  It shows that managers of the SOEs in our sample had gained more 
production autonomy over time in the reform period.   In 1980, on average, 44 percent of 
the output was sold by SOEs to the marketplace, while that figure increased to 75 percent 
in 1994.   With more autonomy of production and sales, SOEs in the sample could also 
keep more of the profit generated.  In 1980, SOEs in the sample was able to retain 22 
percent of profit for their own use on average.  The ratio steadily increased to 70 percent 
by 1994.  Meanwhile, the proportion of non-government shares in total capital stock 
increased at a much slower pace from 6 percent in 1980 to about 22 percent of 1994.  At 
the same time, mark-up ratios were also decreasing as evidenced by Table 1’s 
accumulated input inflation rates minus accumulated output inflation rate.   The different 
in inflation rate peaked around the end of 1980’s and persisted at a high level by 1994. 
One important implication of the summary statistic in Table 1 is that we are 
dealing with cases of marginal rather than large-scale ownership diversification.  In the 
sample, by 1994, on average only 22 percent of ownership share was in the hands of non-
government owners.  That means our test results are relevant to cases of moderate and 
slow ownership changes rather than radical ones.   We need to bear this in mind when 
interpreting the results.  
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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One may be concerned that there might not be enough cross-sectional variations 
for each of the reform variables so that the panel data regressions implemented, are only 
driven by time series variations.  In other words, within each year, all SOEs in our sample 
shared similar levels of production autonomy, profit retention, etc.  It turns out that the 
worry is not warranted.   Table 1 shows that in each given year, the cross-sectional 
variation is significant as captured by the large standard deviation relative to the mean of 
the corresponding variable.  Thus, whatever results the regressions will be likely to be 
driven by both cross-sectional and time-series variations.  
Table 2 provides information on the GROR of those SOEs in the sample.  The 
first column from left is the rate of return on asset calculated by directly using accounting 
data.  It shows a dramatic decrease in the gross rate of return on asset in nominal or 
accounting terms.  The rate was as high as 54 percent in 1980 and dropped to 17 percent 
in 1990.  The second column makes an adjustment to the first column by using the 1994 
prices of input and output to reconstruct the gross profit.  The gross profit is measured at 
the constant price level of 1994.  Note that the calculated rate of return was very high at 
the early years of the reform period.  This is due to the fact that the denominator, the total 
asset value, was calculated at the price level of 1980.   Thus, the final adjustment we 
made was to deflate the rate of return of the second column by economy wide inflation 
rate.   The outcome of the adjustment still shows the same picture, i.e., the gross rate of 
return on asset decreased from well above 20 percent in the 1980’s to under 20 percent 
after 1990. 
Based on the summary statistics, we made some adjustments in the regressions of 
GROR.  We include a time trend variable, i.e., year, to capture the effect that GROR of 
all firms tended to decrease over time.  The idea is to filter out common time trend 
between GROR and some of the reform measures.  Second, for three special years in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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recent history of the Chinese economy, 1984 (price surge due to price reform), 1989 
(Political turmoil), and 1993 (high inflation after Deng’s south China tour), we create a 
dummy variable for each of them in order to control for their unusual impact. 
It is interesting to study the correlation among the reform variables in Table 3.   
Not surprisingly, all the reform variables are positively correlated with each other.     
However, the correlation is not very strong, in general.  The coefficients of correlation 
varying between 0.13 to 0.34. The highest correlation is between non-state ownership and 
production autonomy, which is 0.34.  This means that it was often the case that some 
SOEs with higher non-government ownership shares enjoyed less production autonomy 
than those with less non-government shares.   Although this sounds very strange, 
considering the heterogeneity of the sample with SOEs of different size, different 
locations, and different industries, this is not surprising.  For example, one province might 
have implemented significant reforms in increasing SOE production autonomy with little 
reforms diversifying SOE ownership, while other provinces have done the opposite.   The 
heterogeneity of the sample in this regard makes it possible for us to test the impact of 
alternative reforms of the SOE.  
The correlation between GROR and TFP is also interesting.  We have argued 
above that TFP may not be a good measure of SOE performance and GROR should be a 
better measure.  If these two are highly correlated, then the discussion is only of 
theoretical interest.  It turns out that in our sample, correlation between them is weak. As 
Table 4 indicates, the coefficient of correlation is only 0.0061. The economic significance 
of this finding is that TFP and GROR in the sample are two rather different indices of 
SOE performance.  Therefore, if there are any common patterns in the two groups of 
regressions using them as dependent variables individually, then the common economic 




4.2. Regression Results 
We are now ready to describe the regression results.  The two sets of regressions 
based on production function and GROR rely on a panel data pooling cross-sectional data 
(up to 680 firms) and time series data (up to 15 years) but give each firm a distinct 
constant term.  Thus, they are standard fixed effect regressions.  First let us examine the 
regressions based on production function or the TFP regressions.   Tables 5-A and 5-B, 
report the regressions of the logarithm of deflated output on that of labour, capital, and 
deflated raw material, and time trend (the time variable).   In the first column of Table 5-
A, which shows a simple production function regression without distinguishing different 
industries, the coefficients on logarithm of labour, capital, and raw material are all 
statistically significant and are of appropriate values.   They add up to a level close to 
1.01, suggesting a proximity to a constant return to scale in production technology in the 
sample SOEs.  The coefficient of the time trend (the time variable) captures the annual 
growth rate of TFP, which turns out to be statistically significant at more than 1 percent 
level.   The estimated TFP growth rate of the SOEs in our sample is 3.2 percent, which is 
very close to those reported in may studies on Chinese SOEs’ TFP growth in the literature. 
Tables 5-A and 5-B also have regressions that further decompose the TFP into 
contributions of various reform variables.   In other words, the TFP is captured by the 
sum the error term and all the terms other than the production factors (labor, material, and 
capital).
5   Production autonomy, whether it is measured by a dummy variable or a ratio 
of market output to total output, is never positive and statistically insignificant in any 
regressions.  Only in the last column of Table 5-B, is the autonomy dummy negative and 
                                                 
5 Note that an alternative way is to first do simple regressions of output on production factors and then use 
the residuals as dependent variable to run regressions on various reform variables.  Our one-strike 
regression is more efficient than the two-step procedure.  Thus, the production function regressions are not 
similar to the GROR regressions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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statistically significant.  This shows that granting production autonomy as a measure of 
managerial reform was not effective in increasing an SOE’s TFP.  Profit incentive, as 
measured by the coefficient of profit retention rates, is positive and statistically 
significant in all regressions.   The value of the coefficient ranges from 0.07 to 0.109, 
indicating that a increase of every 10 in profit share to an SOE would have raised the TFP 
of the SOE by 0.7% to 1.1%.   Finally, the term of the multiplication of profit incentive 
and the autonomy dummy has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
indicating that granting autonomy and profit incentive at the same time was effective than 
implementing each of them.  In sum, we can say that we have some evidence for profit 
incentives increasing TFP but not for production autonomy and the two reform measures 
implemented together are more effective than each of them alone. 
 
It is clear from Tables 5-A and 5-B that the index of ownership diversification as 
well as mark-up ratio are all statistically significant for increasing the TFP.   Moreover, in 
comparison with profit shares, ownership shares and mark-up ratios are of much higher 
order in economic importance than profit shares.  For example, in each of the regressions, 
the effect of 10% increase in non-state ownership is roughly twice as much as that of the 
same amount of increase in profit share.   The same can be said about mark-up ratios.  
Interestingly, the cross-effect of autonomy and ownership is statistically insignificant 
while that between profit share and ownership is negative and statistically significant.   
One possible explanation is that for an SOE with high proportion of non-state ownership, 
it is not necessary to give the SOE employees a lot of profit share to improve efficiency.  
Proper monitoring and careful selection of SOE managers might be more effective than 
loading the employees with high profit incentives, which are subject to accounting abuses. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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As for the regressions of gross rate of return on assets, basically, the same pattern 
as that in the TFP regressions remains.
6  Production autonomy does not have a stable, 
positive, and statistically significant effect across alternative regression models.  Profit 
share retention is mostly statistically insignificant except for one specification of the 
regression (the third column).  The multiplication term of autonomy and profit incentives 
has a positive and significant coefficient, while that of the production autonomy dummy 
and profit incentive term has negative and significant sign.   Thus, based on these 
regressions, we cannot reach any conclusions on the existence of the cross effects of 
autonomy and profit incentives on SOEs. 
The ownership share and mark-up ratio are consistently and positively significant 
across regressions in Table 6.  In addition, they are economically significant.  For 
example, an increase of 10 percent in non-government ownership share and mark-up ratio, 
the gross rate of return would jump by 5.5% and 2.7%, respectively.  Note that the direct 
effect of a higher mark-up ratio as measured in the regressions should be to repress the 
gross rate of return, since a higher mark-up ratio in the model indicates more intense   
product market competition and therefore lower rate of return to assets.  Thus, the finding 
shows that the indirect effect of a more competition in increase SOE efficiency must be 
high enough to off set the direct effect.  Finally, estimates on cross effect between 
autonomy and ownership share are not stable, while the same between profit share and 
ownership share tend to be negative.   Again, we cannot reach any conclusions in this 
regard. 
Overall, the two sets of empirical tests yield the following conclusions.   First, 
ownership diversification has economically large and positive impact on the performance 
of state enterprises.  This effect is robust in both the TFP and GROR regressions.  Note 
                                                 
6 Unlike the production function based TFP regressions, there is no need to include production factors in the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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that the range of the changes of ownership diversification was rather limited in the sample.  
Thus, the findings show that a moderate ownership reform can be very important and 
effective in improving SOE efficiency. Second, the evidence on the impact of managerial 
autonomy and profit incentives is rather mixed.  Across different regressions, there do not 
seem to be any consistent patterns of the sign of the coefficients.  The same can be said 
about the cross effect between autonomy and profit incentives.  Third, we have robust 
evidence for the positive impact of product market competition on the performance of 
state enterprises.   However, we cannot find strong evidence to support the same claim 
about the cross effect between autonomy and ownership and profit incentive and 
ownership reform. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we test two schools of thoughts on strategies of state enterprise 
reform, the ownership school and the management school.   We are able to do so by 
utilizing a large panel dataset of state enterprises in China, which has experimented with a 
wide range of strategies in reforming the state enterprises.  We find that moderate 
ownership diversification in the Chinese case has consistent and economically significant 
impact on improving the performance of state enterprises while strategies of management 
reform including granting production autonomy and profit incentives do not have 
persistent and economically significant effect on enterprise performance.  In summary, 
the findings yield strong support for the ownership school and leaves mixed evidence for 
the management school. 
Our empirical findings carry important policy implications.  First of all, a 
moderate diversification of the ownership structure of state enterprises can be a key to 
                                                                                                                                                  
GROR regressions, since the index GROR already takes such factors into account. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 435 
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improve the economic performance of enterprises.  It is not the case with managerial 
reforms.  Our evidence show rather mixed effects of managerial reforms. Granted, 
ownership reforms might face much higher political and economic obstacles and this is 
why they are not widely practiced in many economies.  In this regard, China’s state 
enterprise reform, which is currently concerned with reducing government ownership, is 
moving in the right direction.   In fact, many of the profit losing small and medium SOEs 
have being privatized or liquidated by Chinese governments (mostly at sub-provincial 
level). Currently, a topical issue in China is on reducing government shares in companies 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Reform Variables by Year 
 
Year Autonomy:   
percentage of out 
of plan output 
value in the total 
output value 
Profit share: 
percentage of  
retained profit 
in the total 
profit 
Ownership fraction : 
percentage of non-
traditional-state 
investment in the 
accumulative total 
investment 
Markup ratio: the 
difference between 
accumulative input 
price change and 
accumulative output 
price change 
1980 44  22  6  0 
 (49)  (26)  (22)  (0) 
1981 46  24  7  5 
 (49)  (29)  (22)  (21) 
1982 48  27  7  6 
 (49)  (29)  (20)  (39) 
1983 49  31  7  16 
 (49)  (28)  (18)  (37) 
1984 51  36  8  19 
 (49)  (30)  (18)  (30) 
1985 57  38  9  27 
 (47)  (30)  (18)  (38) 
1986 59  41  10  43 
 (47)  (30)  (18)  (48) 
1987 61  39  11  58 
 (46)  (28)  (20)  (60) 
1988 62  40  13  95 
 (46)  (30)  (22)  (80) 
1989 63  39  14  101 
 (45)  (30)  (23)  (90) 
1990 72  61  18  97 
 (37)  (25)  (19)  (93) 
1991 73  60  21  92 
 (36)  (24)  (19)  (102) 
1992 74  63  24  87 
 (36)  (23)  (18)  (103) 
1993 74  68  25  91 
 (36)  (23)  (18)  (115) 
1994 75  70  27  73 
 (36)  (23)  (18)  (118) 





































return on total 
assets (with 
depreciation), 
at 1994 market 
prices 
1980 54  54  88  88  34  34 
 (98)  (98)  (256)  (256) (115)  (115) 
1981 45  46  76  78  31  32 
 (107)  (111)  (255)  (262) (127)  (131) 
1982 42  43  71  73  27  28 
 (97)  (100)  (225)  (230) (110)  (113) 
1983 39  40  77  79  30  30 
 (82)  (86)  (211)  (217) (107)  (110) 
1984 42  43  82  84  35  36 
 (89)  (92)  (191)  (196) (106)  (109) 
1985 19  19  39  40  18  18 
 (52)  (54)  (138)  (142)  (77)  (79) 
1986 19  19  46  47  22  22 
 (48)  (49)  (116)  (119)  (67)  (69) 
1987 20  21  51  52  25  26 
 (55)  (56)  (121)  (123)  (78)  (80) 
1988 22  23  58  60  34  35 
 (56)  (57)  (100)  (102)  (65)  (66) 
1989 16  16  34  36  23  24 
 (59)  (60)  (69)  (73)  (50)  (52) 
1990 14  14  28  29  18  19 
 (16)  (16)  (27)  (28)  (20)  (21) 
1991 14  14  24  25  16  17 
 (16)  (17)  (24)  (25)  (19)  (20) 
1992 14  15  20  22  15  16 
 (12)  (13)  (20)  (21)  (15)  (17) 
1993 17  19  22  24  19  21 
 (13)  (14)  (19)  (21)  (21)  (22) 
1994 17  18  17  18  17  18 
 (12)  (14)  (12)  (14)  (12)  (14) 








Table 3 Correlation among Reform Variables 
 








Autonomy  1.0000      
Autonomy 
Dummy 
0.2279 1.0000      
Profit 
Retention 
0.1808 0.2655 1.0000    
Non-State  
Shares 
0.1438 0.3360 0.2546 1.0000  
Markup 
Ratio 










Table 4 Correlation Between Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and GDP Deflated Return 
on Total Assets (DGROR) 
 
Correlation DGROR  TFP 
DGROR 1.0000   
TFP 0.0061  1.0000 
 
 




  Table 5-A Fixed-Effect Productivity Regressions 
Variables  Dependent variable: Log(output) at 1980 prices   
Log(raw mat.), at 1980 prices  0.40***  (43.58)  0.48***   (19.2)  0.43***   (51.4)  0.43***     (51.6) 
Log(raw mat.) *Min. & util. 
Ind.dum. 
 -0.25***    (-6.8)     
Log(raw mat.)*Light manu. 
Ind. dum. 
  -0.06        (-1.8)     
Log(raw mat.)*Chem. Ind. 
dum. 
 -0.13***    (-4.1)     
Log(raw mat.)*Heavy manu. 
Ind. dum. 
  -0.07**    (-2.5)     
Log(capital) at 1980 prices  0.18***    (10.2)  0.37***    (8.8)  0.14***   (8.7)  0.14***       (8.7) 
Log(cap.) *Min. and util. Ind. 
dum. 
  -0.2***     (-2.7)     
Log(cap.)*Light manu. Ind. 
dum. 
  -0.3***     (-6.3)     
Log(cap.)*Chem. Ind. dum.   -0.19***      (-3.6)     
Log(cap.)*Heavy manu. Ind. 
dum. 
 -0.17***      (-3.5)     
Log(labor)  0.43***    (13.4)  0.47***     (3.4)  0.39***   (13.5)  0.39***     (13.5) 
Log(labor) *Min. and util. 
Ind. dum. 
  -0.33**     (-2.0)     
Log(labor)*Light manu. Ind. 
dum. 
  -0.11        (-0.7)     
Log(labor)*Chem. Ind. dum.    -0.01        (-0.05)     
Log(labor)*Heavy manu. Ind. 
dum. 
  0.12          (0.4)     
Autonomy     -0.012    (-0.772)   
Output autonomy year dum.        0.008        (0.54) 
Profit share      0.059*** (2.61)  0.058***  (2.58) 
Ownership fraction      0.11**     (1.96)  0.10*        (1.87) 
Markup ratio      0.22***   (28.1)  0.22***    (28.1) 
Auto.*Owner. fraction        
Auto. Dum.*Owner. fraction        
Prof. Share*Owner. fraction        
Auto.*Prof. Share        
Auto. Dum.*Prof. Share        
1984 year dum.      0.07***   (3.37)  0.07***    (3.43) 
1989 year dum.      0.024       (1.20)  0.025        (1.26) 
1993 year dum.      -0.013    (-0.83)  -0.014      (-0.85) 
Time trend  0.032***   (19.6)  0.033*** (19.98)  0.017*** (7.95)  0.016***  (6.81) 
Constant  0.23           (1.12)  -0.013    (-0.065)  0.45*       (2.57)  0.44**      (2.47) 
Number of observations  4414 4414  4414  4414 





    
Table 5-B Fixed-Effect Productivity Regressions (Cont.) 
Variables  Dependent variable: Log(output) at 1980 prices   
Log(raw mat.), at 1980 prices  0.52***   (22.8)  0.52***   (22.8)  0.52***     (22.8)    0.51***   (22.6) 
Log(raw mat.) *Min. & util. Ind.dum.  -0.27***  (-8.19)  -0.27*** (-8.21)  -0.28***  (-8.34)   -0.28***  (-8.30) 
Log(raw mat.)*Light manu. Ind. dum.  -0.06**     (-2.0)  -0.06**    (-2.0)  -0.06**    (-2.06)   -0.06**    (-2.01) 
Log(raw mat.)*Chem. Ind. dum.  -0.11***  (-3.74)  -0.11***  (-3.7)  -0.11***  (-3.72)   -0.11***  (-3.64) 
Log(raw mat.)*Heavy manu. Ind. dum.  -0.08***  (-3.05)  -0.08*** (-3.05)  -0.08***  (-3.11)   -0.08***  (-3.02) 
Log(capital) at 1980 prices  0.27***   (6.96)  0.27***  (6.98)  0.27***     (7.01)    0.27***   (7.13) 
Log(cap.) *Min. and util. Ind. dum.  -0.11        (-1.61)  -0.11      (-1.62)  -0.11        (-1.60)   -0.12        (-1.71) 
Log(cap.)*Light manu. Ind. dum.  -0.24***  (-5.64)  -0.25*** (-5.68)  -0.25***  (-5.66)   -0.25***  (-5.74) 
Log(cap.)*Chem. Ind. dum.  -0.13***  (-2.66)  -0.13*** (-2.69)  -0.13***  (-2.69)  -0.13***   (-2.73) 
Log(cap.)*Heavy manu. Ind. dum.  -0.09*      (-1.93)  -0.09*     (-1.95)  -0.09**    (-1.98)  -0.09**     (-2.08) 
Log(labor)  0.33***    (2.62)  0.33***   (2.58)  0.32**       (2.50)   0.34***    (2.72) 
Log(labor) *Min. and util. Ind. dum.  -0.26*      (-1.72)  -0.26*     (-1.7)  -0.24        (-1.60)  -0.26*       (-1.72) 
Log(labor)*Light manu. Ind. dum.  0.02         (-0.15)  -0.02       (-0.17)  0.03           (0.24)   0.01           (0.05) 
Log(labor)*Chem. Ind. dum.  0.10           (0.71)  0.10         (0.73)  0.11           (0.80)   0.08           (0.59) 
Log(labor)*Heavy manu. Ind. dum.  0.19            (1.4)  0.20         (1.43)  0.21           (1.52)   0.18           (1.34) 
Autonomy  -0.0006  (-0.044)    -0.003      (-0.11)   
Output autonomy year dum.    -0.005    (-0.38)    -0.10***   (-3.07) 
Profit share  0.07***    (3.22)  0.07***   (3.24)  0.109***   (3.36)   0.08***     (3.08) 
Ownership fraction  0.15***    (2.72)  0.15***   (2.74)  0.21**       (2.25)   0.31***     (3.76) 
Markup ratio  0.22***    (28.2)  0.22***   (28.2)  0.22***     (28.1)   0.22***     (28.31) 
Auto.*Owner. fraction      0.107         (1.18)   
Auto. Dum.*Owner. fraction         0.063          (0.93) 
Prof. Share*Owner. fraction      -0.24**    (-2.16)  -0.38***   (-3.16) 
Auto.*Prof. Share      -0.02        (-0.50)   
Auto. Dum.*Prof. Share         0.14***    (3.30) 
1984 year dum.  0.066***   (3.47)  0.066***   (3.45)  0.06***    (3.38)   0.064***  (3.36) 
1989 year dum.  0.026         (1.35)  0.025         (1.32)  0.02          (1.22)   0.024        (1.24) 
1993 year dum.  -0.014    (-0.908)  -0.014      (-0.87)  -0.012      (-0.76)  -0.014       (-0.89) 
Time trend  0.017***   (8.11)  0.017***   (7.52)  0.017***  (8.16)   0.018***  (7.58) 
Constant  0.32**       (1.69)  0.32**      (1.72)  0.31*         (1.65)   0.29          (1.54) 
Number of observations  4414 4414  4414  4414 
R-square  0.7099 0.7099  0.7103  0.7111 





Table 6 Fixed-Effect Regressions of GDP Deflated Return on Total Assets  
(GROR) (with depreciation) at 1994 market prices 
 
  Dependent variable: DGROR 
Autonomy  -0.04*     (-1.65)  0.18***   (4.87)     
Output autonomy year dummy      -0.019     (-0.77)  -0.15*** (-3.06) 
Profit share  0.018       (0.53)  0.098*     (1.95)  0.019       (0.56)  0.055      (1.33) 
Ownership fraction  0.56***   (6.46)  1.36***   (9.56)  0.55***   (6.41)  0.74***   (5.63) 
Markup ratio  0.27***   (22.5)  0.27***   (23.0)  0.27***   (22.5)  0.27***   (22.5) 
Auto.*Owner. fraction   -1.36***  (-9.60)    
Auto dum.*Owner, fraction        0.26**     (2.45) 
Prof. Share*Owner. fraction    0.17         (0.97)    -0.64*** (-3.32) 
Auto.*Prof. Share    -0.15*     (-2.29)     
Auto dum.*Prof. Share        0.15**     (2.27) 
1984 year dummy  0.049       (1.61)  0.047       (1.55)  0.05         (1.64)  0.05         (1.49) 
1989 year dummy  -0.05       (-1.62)  -0.06**   (-2.04)  -0.05       (-1.64)  -0.05*     (-1.69) 
1993 year dummy  0.002     (0.085)  0.009       (0.36)  0.006       (0.22)  0.005       (0.18) 
Time trend  -0.014***  (-4.9) -0.02***  (-5.89) -0.014***  (-4.4) -0.012***(-3.75) 
Constant  0.04*       (1.82)  -0.07*** (-2.77)  0.018       (0.97)  0.005      (0.24) 
Number of Observations  4414 4414 4414 4414 
R-square  0.1313 0.1559 0.1309 0.1342 
 
           Note: t-ratios are in parentheses. 
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